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THREE RULES FOR EDUCATING TOMORROW'S LAWYERS
Michael D. Cicchini*
ABSTRACT
Legal education reform is currently a hot topic. The
most promising ideas involve elevating skills-based training
from its current sideshow status (where it is taught by ad-
junct and clinical instructors) to a meaningful and integral
part of the mainstream curriculum. This type of skills-based
reform, however, not only faces some practical roadblocks,
but also it glosses over legal education's deeper, more fun-
damental problem: the failure to adequately train students
in the underlying substantive and procedural law. To ad-
dress this more immediate issue, this Essay recommends
three basic rules for reform. First, professors should teach
an actual body of law, instead of a cobbled-together, multi-
state mishmash of cases from a casebook. Second, profes-
sors should teach the complete body of law, including the
many topics they mistakenly view as too pedestrian to war-
rant classroom time. Third, professors should publish schol-
arship that benefits the bench and bar, rather than the
academy, thereby strengthening their understanding of the
important subjects they teach their students. This Essay ex-
plains the incredible benefits that would flow to students
from this proposed, three-part reform, and further demon-
strates how these three rules for educating tomorrow's law-
yers can be implemented today, by the existing
professoriate and without any structural changes to the ex-
isting legal education model.
* J.D., summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., University of
Illinois Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); B.S.,
University of Wisconsin-Parkside (1990). Michael Cicchini is a criminal defense lawyer and has been
recognized as one of the "top young lawyers," the "top trial lawyers," and the "top criminal defense
lawyers" in Wisconsin. He is the author of Tried and Convicted: How Police, Prosecutors, and Judges
Destroy Our Constitutional Rights (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012) and a coauthor of But
They Didn't Read Me My Rights! Myths, Oddities, and Lies About Our Legal System (Prometheus
Books, 2010). He has published extensively in law reviews, authoring or coauthoring a dozen articles
and essays on constitutional law, criminal law and procedure, law and economics, and law and
psychology. He also writes regularly at The Legal Watchdog blog. Visit www.cicchinilaw.com for web
links and more information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I recently received an email from the State Bar of Wisconsin claiming
that "[e]ducating tomorrow's lawyers is a shared responsibility."' The gist
of the email was that I should participate in the bar's lengthy, online survey
about legal education. The email then assured me that the study, a joint
effort between the bar and the University of Denver, will "undoubtedly
advance the profession."2
Because I disagreed with both claims-that is, I believe the "responsi-
bility" for "educating tomorrow's lawyers" falls squarely on the shoulders
of law professors, and I seriously doubt the bar's latest dues-funded frolic
will "advance the profession"-I declined to spend the required thirty to
forty minutes on the survey. But after further thought, I decided that, al-
though I have no "responsibility" to do so, I actually have something to
contribute toward legal education reform. And this Essay, rather than the
bar's survey, is the best way to make that contribution.
When it comes to comprehensive, top-to-bottom legal education re-
form, the heavy lifting has already been done. One of the best articles ever
written on the subject is Brent E. Newton's The Ninety-Five Theses: Sys-
temic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure.3 First, and
most importantly, Newton correctly diagnoses the underlying problem: law
schools are currently being operated for the benefit of law professors
rather than law students.4 (Then, most of his "ninety-five theses" are de-
veloped from this premise.) And second, Newton's recommendations are
comprehensive and encompass nearly every meaningful reform ever pro-
posed, both before and since his article was published.
Part II of this Essay briefly discusses some of Newton's theses-the
most promising of which would elevate skills-based training from its cur-
rent afterthought status to an integral part of the regular curriculum. As
Part II also explains, however, teaching such practical skills (for example,
client counseling, negotiation, fact investigation, and trial skills) would fall
beyond the abilities of most tenured and tenure-track professors-many of
whom have never practiced law. But even aside from this practical road-
block, focusing on skills-based reform actually glosses over a deeper, more
fundamental problem: the failure to adequately instruct students in the ba-
sic substantive and procedural law.
To address this serious but often overlooked problem, Part III pro-
poses three rules for educating tomorrow's lawyers-rules that could easily
be implemented today, by the existing law school professoriate and without
1. E-mail from George C. Brown, Executive Director, State Bar of Wisconsin, to members of
the State Bar of Wisconsin (Jan. 15, 2015, 08:05 a.m. CST) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education
and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55 (2012).
4. Id. at 61 ("The current systemic failures of American legal education-many of which in-
volve the exploitation and betrayal of law students by full-time faculty members at many schools-have
deleterious effects on the ethical health of the profession.").
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any structural changes to the existing law-school model. First, professors
must teach students an actual body of law instead of the meaningless, juris-
dictional mishmash of cases found in the typical casebook. Second, profes-
sors must teach students all of the topics within that body of law (i.e., teach
the little things), including those topics they mistakenly assume are not im-
portant enough to justify classroom time. And third, in order to strengthen
their knowledge of the law they are teaching, professors should produce
scholarship for the bench and bar, not the academy.
In explaining these three rules for reform, this Essay acknowledges
Newton's many contributions and also cites several other sources. But my
goal is to avoid one of the plagues of the modern law review article: exces-
sive and even circular citation to so-called authority.5 Instead, my three
rules for educating tomorrow's lawyers are rooted primarily in my own le-
gal education, my extensive experience practicing law, my experience edu-
cating other lawyers at continuing legal education seminars, my extensive
research and writing for law reviews and book publishers, and my genuine
(but admittedly morose) interest in the current state of legal education.
II. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE "THESES"
As valuable as Newton's article is, I do not agree with all of his ninety-
five theses-and, in fairness, he warned that even like-minded reformers
would disagree with some of his ideas.6 For example, thesis number eighty-
three recommends that law review article selection and editing duties be
transferred from the law students to the professoriate.7 This would be un-
wise, and would even contradict Newton's thesis number seventy-nine
which calls for more practical scholarship.8 Using my own body of pub-
lished work as an example, if law professors had been in charge of the
article-selection process my ideas may never have met the printed page.
Law students, on the other hand, are far more interested in practice-related
topics; most students go to law school to eventually practice law, whereas
law professors come to law school to escape or even avoid practicing law.
And some of Newton's theses, while excellent in theory, have little
chance of being implemented. For example, he recommends that new
5. Jeffrey Harrison, Ethics, Citations, Gaming the Law Review Ranking System: The Circle of
Deceit, CLASS BIAS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 28, 2015), http://classbias.blogspot.com/2015/01/ethics-
citations-gaming-law-ranking.html (A law review footnote is not a citation to authority, but rather is
merely a statement that "another author said so and, of course, that author cited another author who
cited another one. A vast amount of law review writing is built on a stack of hearsay."). Perhaps in
light of the problem Harrison describes, law journals are now inviting shorter, lightly-footnoted essays,
and many online companion journals have been designed exclusively for very short discussion-type
pieces.
6. Newton, supra note 3, at 60 ("1 hardly expect most readers to accept all of my points, but I
hope that thoughtful readers will start looking at top-to-bottom change as the surest way out of the
current mess.").
7. Id. at 130. In fairness to Newton, he does recommend that "distinguished members of the
bench and bar" also play a role in article selection and editing. Id. However, there likely are not
enough lawyers and judges who care enough about law reviews to fill this role. As a result, article
selection would eagerly be usurped by the professors who would continue to publish more of the same.
8. Id. at 126.
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faculty be hired from a more diverse applicant pool to include top gradu-
ates of non-elite law schools9 who excelled as practitioners.1 ° While I ap-
plaud the idea of law schools hiring lawyers who have proven themselves in
the legal profession, it is not likely to happen. The legal academy has been
infiltrated by the elite-J.D. crowd"-many of whom have never practiced
law" and some of whom are not even licensed to do so.13 More recently,
the legal academy has been invaded by the elite-Ph.D. crowd'4 -many of
whom are not even law school graduates let alone lawyers.5 And in the
process, this unlikely group of law professors has created a self-perpetuat-
ing hierarchy that will likely remain intact.
1 6
But the most promising of Newton's theses involve, in one way or an-
other, teaching students practice- or skills-based competencies such as pub-
lic speaking, negotiation, client communication, strategic thinking,
collaboration, fact investigation and development, general management,
and courtroom-based skills. Further, Newton realizes the importance of
integrating such skills training into the regular law school curriculum,
1 7
rather than treating it as a mere sideshow to be taught by the marginalized
adjunct18 and clinical 9 instructors.
It is difficult to argue with Newton's skills-based recommendations,
and there is no doubt that educating students in these areas is indeed possi-
ble. But there are still at least two major obstacles to this type of reform.
First, law school professors-especially those that never or barely practiced
law or, worse yet, never went to law school-are probably ill-equipped to
9. Id. at 112 (recommending that law schools abandon their "elitism and open up hiring to
qualified graduates from lower-ranked schools").
10. Id. at 109 (recommending that law schools hire professors based, at least in part, on "their
records as successful practitioners").
11. Paul Campos, Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites, 37 HIARV. J.L. & Pun. PO.-'y
179, 180 (2014) (citing evidence that "85.6% of new hires received their J.D. degrees from one of a total
of twelve elite law schools").
12. Newton, supra note 3, at 112-13 (explaining that "practical experience often hurts an aspiring
professor's chances of being hired" and "the typical new professor possesses only one year of practical
experience"); see Campos, supra note 11, at 180 ("A 2003 study found that the average amount of
experience in the practice of law among new hires at top twenty-five law schools, among those hires
who had any such experience, was 1.4 years.").
13. Newton, supra note 3, at 113 ("It is common knowledge that, at many law schools, several
members of the full-time faculty do not possess law licenses . . . [and] some professors even wear their
lack of a license as a badge of honor.").
14. Id. at 115 (citing evidence that, at some schools, "over one-third of new hires" possess a
Ph.D.).
15. Campos, supra note 11, at 181 ("A new study of the top twenty-six law school faculties
reveals that those faculties include sixty-six tenure-track faculty members who do not have law
degrees.").
16. Newton, supra note 3, at 111 ("It simply cannot be that the top graduates from the 180 or so
'lesser' law schools would not be as capable law professors as graduates from 'elite' law schools.").
17. Id. at 99 ("Virtually all doctrinal courses in law schools should be experiential or skills
courses.").
18. Id. at 123 ("The relative pittance paid to adjunct professors is a reflection of the low value
that most law schools place on adjunct faculty members and, more generally, on teaching.").
19. Id. at 121 ("The law professors who teach students the most important courses in terms of
preparing them to be competent practitioners-clinicians and legal research and writing professors-
are generally paid less, denied the right to earn tenure, and given little, if any, faculty voting rights.").
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provide such skills-based training. Integrating such training into the main-
stream curriculum would, therefore, require major reform that would be
costly and time consuming to implement. Second, there is an even more
fundamental problem: skills-based competencies are of little value without
a solid foundation in the underlying substantive and procedural law.
For example, a criminal defense lawyer may be a very good communi-
cator (a skills-based competency), but that does little good if the lawyer is
not well trained in the underlying substantive law (for example, lesser-in-
cluded offenses and potential affirmative defenses) and procedural law (for
example, pretrial procedures and discovery rules). By way of analogy, a
medical doctor may have a superior "bedside manner," but if he or she
lacks an understanding of human anatomy and the available diagnostic
tests, his or her communication skills are of little value to the patient with a
broken arm.
It is difficult to find a medical doctor as poorly trained as the one de-
scribed above. As the next section explains, however, new lawyers are
commonly ignorant of the substantive and procedural law in their area of
practice. And this justifiably causes a tremendous amount of stress and
anxiety for the new lawyer who is thrown into the fray.20 Worse yet, the
true victim is not the lawyer, but the legal-services-consuming public for
whom the lawyer works.2 1 In light of the seriousness of this problem, basic
legal education, not skills-based training, is the first and most important
aspect of law school that must be reformed.
III. THREE RULES TO IMPLEMENT TODAY
Changing basic legal education (as opposed to implementing skills-
based training) is relatively easy and inexpensive to accomplish. In fact,
every law professor with a J.D. degree, regardless of whether he or she has
ever practiced law, is capable of immediately and dramatically improving
their students' education in the substantive and procedural law. The fol-
lowing sections set forth three simple rules for educating tomorrow's law-
yers-rules that should be implemented today by the existing professoriate.
A. Rule #1: Teach an Actual Body of Law
Most law school professors teach primary sources of law, such as case
law, rather than secondary sources, such has hornbooks. And there is a
tremendous benefit to studying the actual cases. But the cases used in class
must not consist of a mishmash of cases from multiple states, as is typically
20. See, e.g., Joe Forward, New Lawyers are in a Financial and Emotional Depression, Says State
Bar Task Force, WIsBAR Nizws (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/Pages/Gen-
eralArticle.aspx?ArticlelD=1 1251 (lacking the skills to practice law and carrying staggering amounts of
law-school debt, many new lawyers reported being "scared," "terrified," and even "suicidal").
21. Newton, supra note 3, at 60 ("I also hope that readers will remember that the ultimate bene-
ficiaries (or victims) of our system of legal education and licensure are the members of the public.").
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found in a law school casebook.22 Instead, the assigned cases must com-
prise an actual body of law from a single jurisdiction which, for most sub-
ject areas, will be the state (or the federal circuit) in which the law school is
located. 23
To demonstrate the advantage of this approach, consider the teaching
of substantive criminal law and, more specifically, the so-called statutory-
rape crime. The classic casebook would first include a case from a strict-
liability state where it does not matter, for purposes of criminal liability,
whether the defendant believed the minor was an adult. Then, the
casebook would present a case from a state where the crime is not strict
liability in nature, but instead incorporates some defenses-for example,
the minor's misrepresentation-of-age defense.
This casebook approach, owever, fails to teach the student anything
about his or her state's actual law. Instead, this casebook approach leaves
the soon-to-be lawyer with many important but unanswered questions, in-
cluding: What is the minor-adult age cutoff in my state? Does the age of
the minor affect the maximum potential penalty for the crime and, if so,
what are those cutoffs? Is there a mandatory- or presumptive-minimum
penalty? Does my state permit any affirmative defenses at trial, such as the
minor's misrepresentation of age? Or has my state adopted a strict-liability
approach to this crime? And are there any statutory mitigating or aggra-
vating factors to consider if the case ends in conviction and sentencing?
Here, the classic saying that "a little knowledge is dangerous" rings
true. At best, the new lawyer will realize that he or she is completely igno-
rant of the law and will have to spend numerous hours researching and
studying the relevant statutes and cases from scratch. But that is the best
case scenario. At worst, the new lawyer will recall an isolated fact from his
or her criminal law casebook-for example, the defendant who was al-
lowed to use a misrepresentation-of-age defense-and wrongly assume this
defense is available to his or her client in his or her state. (If it seems
fraught with peril, or even absurd, for a practicing lawyer to rely on a law
school class as a source of actual legal knowledge, then that is further evi-
dence our system of legal education is highly deficient.)
Conversely, had the law school taught its state's actual body of law
rather than a senseless collection of cases from around the country, the new
lawyer would, much like the medical doctor with a knowledge of human
anatomy and the available diagnostic tests, know the answers to the above
questions (or at least would instantly know where to find them). In other
22. Newton also rejects the casebook as a teaching tool, but he argues for replacing it with secon-
dary sources such as hornbooks. Id. at 103.
23. As early as my first semester of law school I found it baffling that we would use a multi-state
casebook instead of our own state's cases-especially given that Wisconsin automatically admits Mar-
quette graduates to the bar, without taking the bar exam, via the diploma privilege. Since that time,
however, at least one Marquette Law School professor has adopted a Wisconsin-centric approach. See
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words, this single-jurisdiction approach to criminal law provides an obvious
and tremendous advantage for future lawyers: it equips them with a real,
rather than fictional, body of law they can instantly apply in practice.
Equally important, this single-jurisdiction approach has no disadvan-
tages; it does not short-change the student in any way. For example, as-
sume that a Wisconsin law school taught the relevant Wisconsin case on
statutory rape (instead of two or more other states' cases from a casebook).
In this situation, the student will still learn that there are different versions
of the law among the states-Wisconsin's high court discusses these com-
peting viewpoints when deciding which approach it will adopt.24 So the
student loses nothing via this more focused, state-specific study of the law.
But what if the student graduates from a Wisconsin law school and
decides to practice in, say, California? In this situation, he or she is still no
worse off than if he or she had learned criminal law through the traditional
casebook: under the single-jurisdiction approach he or she would have
learned the law of a state (Wisconsin) that he or she cannot put to direct
use where he or she practices (California); under the casebook approach he
or she would have learned a cobbled-together, fictional body of law that he
or she cannot put to use anywhere. And under both educational ap-
proaches, the student would have developed the same general and transfer-
able legal reasoning skills.
It is not completely true, however, to say that this single-jurisdiction
approach is better for everyone; it would create more work for the profes-
sor.2 5 Instead of simply telling the students to purchase a pre-made (and
expensive) multi-state casebook, the professor would-continuing with our
criminal law example-actually have to read the state's criminal code and
its annotation from which he or she would have to select the relevant cases
to use in class. But this inconvenience is a small price to pay for having
students emerge from the course with real knowledge about an actual and,
in most cases, useful body of law.
B. Rule #2: Teach the Little Things
Once professors begin teaching an actual body of law from a real juris-
diction, the next step is to teach the complete body of law, including topics
that might seem to the professor to be unworthy of classroom time.
Newton makes essentially the same argument when he argues for con-
straints on academic freedom.2 6
24. The relevant Wisconsin case on point, and one that I recommended to the Marquette profes-
sor who was adopting a Wisconsin-centric approach to his course materials, is State v. Jadowski, 680
N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 2004) (discussing alternative approaches and possible defenses to statutory rape
crimes, and ultimately adopting the strict-liability approach).
25. Newton, supra note 3, at 103 ("The casebook method, which is used in conjunction with the
Socratic method, allows for a relatively easy manner of instruction.").
26. Id. at 100-01 (Many professors "spend an inordinate amount of time covering a small portion
of the course materials that interest them, at the expense of the bulk of the course." Instead, because
their "primary mission should be to produce fiduciaries responsible for the life, liberty, and property of
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I learned of academic freedom firsthand when my law school class (in-
cluding myself) were victimized by it nearly twenty years ago. In constitu-
tional law our visiting professor taught only a few topics-topics which just
so happened to coincide with the subject matter of his article-in-progress. I
am sure it was a fun experience for the professor, but as a result we stu-
dents learned next to nothing about free speech, and even less about the
commerce clause and other important constitutional subjects.
Similarly, our ethics professor ignored many of the actual ethics rules
by which we future lawyers would soon be governed, and instead immersed
us in cases like Annesley v. Anglesea, an eighteenth century dispute liti-
gated in William the Conqueror's Court of Exchequer. Again, this was no
doubt enjoyable for the professor (and perhaps even made him feel schol-
arly), but it left us students ignorant of many of our soon-to-be ethical obli-
gations. And this problem is widespread. As a result of this particular
brand of professorial negligence, few lawyers are aware of the scope of
their duty of confidentiality to clients,27 and most lawyers are surprised to
learn there is a big difference between the ethics rule of confidentiality and
the rule of attorney-client privilege.28
The subject of criminal procedure further demonstrates this point. In
my experience as a criminal defense lawyer, many lawyers and judges are
confounded by even the most basic rules. This was on full display when a
recent trial-court conviction was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
because the defense lawyer, prosecutor, and two trial-court judges did not
understand the substitution-of-judge statute.2 9 Ironically, only the unedu-
cated defendant roughly understood how the procedure worked, yet his
repeated complaints were ignored.3 ° But if any one of the four law school
graduates involved in the case-three of whom graduated from Wisconsin
law schools-had been taught this basic criminal procedure statute, the
state's high court would not have had to explain it to them,31 the conviction
their clients, professors should have more limited discretion when it comes to imparting the necessary
knowledge.").
27. MODEJ Ruj.j.s OF PRO'I CONnUcr r. 1.6, 1.9 (1983). The ABA Model Rules are adopted
(typically verbatim) in nearly every state. Unbeknownst to most practicing lawyers, these rules prohibit
them from discussing, writing about, or otherwise disclosing any information, including publicly availa-
ble information, if such information is in any way related to the representation of the client or former
client. See Carol Rice Andrews, Highway 101: Lessons in Legal Ethics that We Can Learn on the Road,
15 Gijo. J. LiEGAi ETniics 95, 105 (2001) (Lawyers "are ignorant of at least some of their professional
obligations ... the lawyer may never have learned the rule .... Law school courses in professional
responsibility rarely cover every rule.").
28. The ethics rule, "unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or
source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026,
1031 (D.C. 2001) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RI'SPONSIIILrrY EC 4-4 (1983)).
29. State v. Harrison, 858 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 2014).
30. Id. at 376 ("Although the defendant used phrases like "change of judge" and "recusal" in
some of his filings, rather than consistently discussing [the judge's] "substitution" or "authority to act,"
the defendant's goal was clear: He did not want [the judge against whom he had filed a substitution] on
the instant case[.]").
31. Id. at 377-78 (explaining that once a defendant properly exercises his statutory right of substi-
tution against a judge, see WItS. STAT. § 971.20 (2011-12), that judge may no longer preside over the
defendant's trial and sentencing). The lawyers and judges at the trial-court level may have mistakenly
[VOL. 34:1
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would not have been overturned, and the state would not have to spend
additional resources to retry the case.32
These examples demonstrate why professors should teach the little
things. Professors should not focus on their topics of interest at the ex-
pense of what they view as the pedestrian aspects of the law-such as the
ethics rule of confidentiality or the substitution-of-judge statute. And
teaching the little things, much like teaching a real body of law from an
actual jurisdiction, can be accomplished by any professor with a J.D. degree
regardless of his or her legal practice experience.
Professors will predictably respond that there simply is not enough
time to teach all topics in a single course. But first, given what I recall to be
a tremendous amount of wasted time in the classroom, I doubt this is true.
And second, even if it is true, the solution is simple: add an elective to
follow-up on the required course (or a second elective if the first course is
itself an elective).33 Creating meaningful and comprehensive course se-
quences would also benefit the law schools: it would squelch critics' cries
that the third year of law school is useless, and that the entire J.D. should
be completed in two-thirds of the time, credits, and tuition dollars.34
But again, implementing this rule would not be completely cost free.
Because many important topics (including those discussed in this section)
are currently not taught in law school, and because many law professors
have no experience beyond law school, some professors may not even
know that these topics exist.35 Therefore, teaching the little things would
take some preparatory effort: a professor would, once again, have to locate
and read the applicable law-for example, the state's code of criminal pro-
cedure and its annotation-from which he or she would then select the
relevant cases. But despite the extra work, this is a small price to pay for
having students emerge from a class with complete knowledge of a relevant
body of law.
Teaching a relevant (see Rule #1) and complete body of law also gives
students an additional advantage: the opportunity to create a useful out-
line, checklist, annotation, or even a small treatise-like document on a real
subject. This would not only be valuable for the end-of-semester issue-
spotting exam, but, even more importantly, would serve as tangible piece of
work product to bridge the worlds of academia and legal practice. That is,
relied upon subsection (3) and neglected to read as far as subsection (9). Harrison, 858 N.W.2d at 377-
78.
32. Id. at 386 (A unanimous court "remand[ed] the cause to the circuit court for a new trial.").
33. See Newton, supra note 3, at 87 (arguing for better topical coverage through the development
of course sequences).
34. A movement backed by some law professors and even the President of the United States,
suggests that the third year of law school is useless. See Peter Lattman, Obama Says Law School
Should be Two, not Three, Years, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/
obama-says-law-school-should-be-two-years-not-three/?-php=true&-type=blogs&-r=2.
35. David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One:
Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 761,770 (2004) ("Professors who have little practice experience are presumably less likely to be
aware of, or interested in, issues that arise in practice.").
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if the student-turned-lawyer decides to practice in that area of law, he or
she would have already developed, in law school, a relevant and compre-
hensive practice aid that would permit him or her to hit the ground running
upon entering practice.36 Then, this practice aid need only be periodically
modified as the law changes.
This approach to legal education stands in stark contrast to the typical
casebook method that teaches an incomplete and fictional body of law that
the student (wisely) deletes from memory the moment after the final exam.
Conversely, the creation of a useful piece of work product, even if only in
simple, outline form, will benefit the student many years beyond gradua-
tion. Further, creating a tangible piece of work product could be a re-
quired part of every course; at a minimum, professors should encourage the
activity and informally consult with students on their progress throughout
the semester.
C. Rule #3: Write for the Bar, not the Academy
Chief Justice John Roberts famously quipped:
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first
article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel
Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria,
or something, which I'm sure was of great interest to the
academic that wrote it, but isn't of much help to the bar.37
Unfortunately, this criticism is not far off; many articles published in the so-
called top journals give the terrible impression that the professors who
wrote them cared little for the practice of law.
One top law journal, for example, recently published a professor's arti-
cle on the economics of baseball's infield fly rule.38 Not the economics of
player contracts or of antitrust legislation-but the economics of the infield
fly rule. Equally bewildering, another top journal published what appears
to be a professor's speech in which he argued that "solutions to legal
problems.., are arrived at through a process of inference to the best expla-
nation that occurs within a highly interconnected set of nodes that has simi-
larities to a neural network."39
36. Having been victimized by the traditional, multi-state casebook approach in law school, I
spent the first few months of my solo-practice career educating myself on Wisconsin's law by reading
state-specific statutes, cases, and practice aids, by observing trials and other hearings in court, by con-
sulting with local practitioners, and by accepting low-end misdemeanor cases to gain some actual expe-
rience (to the potential detriment of the real-life clients). Unfortunately, few new lawyers have the
time, financial resources, or even organizational ability to self-train in this manner-nor should they
have to, given the tremendous amount of debt and opportunity cost they incurred in going to profes-
sional school.
37. Chief Justice Roberts Comments on Legal Scholarship Today, ADIJUNCr LAW PROF BL ,Oi
(July 8, 2011), http:l/lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/2011/07/chief-justice-roberts-comments-
on-legal-scholarship-today.html.
38. Howard M. Wasserman, The Economics of the Infield Fly Rule, 2 UTAri L. Ri:v. 479 (2013).
39. Allen on Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the Legal System, CRIMPROF
Bioc; (June 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof-blog/2011/06/allen-on-rationaIity-the-
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Other articles, however, seem to cross the line that separates the head-
scratching from the bizarre, at least to the practicing lawyer. In one such
article, a professor argued that "the mundane reality of the traffic stop" can
destroy our fantasies-"freedom, escape, friendship, romance"-that we
have come to associate with the "open road" through "books, movies,
[and] songs[.]' '40  In a more extreme example, another professor wrote
about how our government should tax zombies in the coming "zombie
apocalypse," and also addressed the important question of "how estate and
income tax laws should apply to vampires and ghosts.
41
It took me a few minutes to identify the source of my frustration, and
perhaps the Chief Justice's frustration, when it comes to law reviews. My
issue with much of the so-called legal scholarship is not that the professors
wrote on such topics-I strongly believe that everyone should be free to
write about sports or neural networks or movie-based fantasies or (espe-
cially) zombies. But the problem is that law professors might not be writ-
ing such articles on their own time; they could be getting paid many tens of
thousands of dollars per article in what might essentially be a tuition-subsi-
dized frolic.42
In any case, all of this could be corrected if the professors, as part of
their jobs, would simply write articles for lawyers and judges instead of for
their fellow professors.43 But what does this have to do with legal educa-
tion? Exploring and writing about practical legal issues will strengthen and
deepen a professor's understanding of the material he or she is teaching to
students.44
law-of-evidence-and-the-nature-of-the-legal-system.html. It appears there may be an article and also a
secondary article (with a slightly modified title) that is a transcription of a lecture on the same topic-
possibly two CV-filling publications for the price of one. For what appears to be the lecture-based
article, see Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REv. 1047 (2011).
40. Nancy Leong, The Open Road and the Traffic Stop: Narratives and Counter-Narratives of the
American Dream, 64 FLA. L. Rv. 305 (2012). This piece actually led to a tremendous amount of
criticism, including some entertaining satirical criticism, by the scam-blogger movement. See, e.g., The
Law School Scam is Like a Highway to Dreamland. An Annotated Fictional Tribute to Prof. Nancy
Leong's Sholarshit [sic] Article, Ou-rsioJ. "rm LAW SCHOOL SCAM (Oct. 25, 2013), http://outsidethelaw
schoolscam.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-law-school-scam-is-like-highway-to_25.html.
41. Adam Chodorow, Death and Taxes and Zombies, 98 IowA L. REV. 1207 (2013). Unfortu-
nately, in a case of zombie-see-zombie-do, this admittedly eye-catching and clever title is producing
some copycat scholarship-at least in form if not in substance. See, e.g., Paul Caron, Huang & Rosen:
The Zombie Lawyer Apocalypse, TAXPROi- BLOG (Feb. 15, 2015), http://taxprof.typepad.comltaxprof-
blog/2015/02/huang-rosen-.html.
42. Newton, supra note 3, at 128 ("The typical law review article published by a full-time law
professor costs at least $25,000, and in some cases, as much as $100,000. That amount of money repre-
sents a portion of the professor's annual salary, a very large percentage of which is funded by student
tuition.").
43. Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 35, at 764-66 (rejecting the false theoretical-versus-practical
dichotomy in legal scholarship and instead advocating for the production of "engaged scholarship").
44. Newton has a different but equally reasonable view on this: scholarship (at least in its current
form) does not positively impact teaching; therefore, time spent writing articles should be reallocated to
"teaching law students to be effective practitioners[.]" Newton, supra note 3, at 107. Hricik and
Salzmann, however, agree that writing practical legal scholarship will make professors better teachers.
Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 35, at 775. They further claim that this will not only benefit students in
the classroom, but will also benefit the law review members that edit the articles. Id. at 774 (arguing
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
But first, the bad news: unlike teaching an actual (see Rule #1) and
complete (see Rule #2) body of law, writing for the bar rather than for the
academy may not be a realistic option for professors who are on the tenure
track, but have yet to earn tenure. It is no secret that, at the pre-tenure
stage, writing for lawyers rather than for other professors is a surefire way
to a short-lived academic career.4" In fact, such practical scholarship is
"openly discouraged" in the legal academy.46
And now the good news: for tenured professors (and for untenured
professors who are feeling rebellious), writing for the bar instead of the
academy does not require any actual legal practice experience.7 While
many of my own articles certainly were the product of practice experience,
others were the result of merely observing the courtroom. For example, I
wrote an article titled An Alternative to the Wrong-Person Defense48 be-
cause, when sitting in the courtroom waiting for a case to be called, I ob-
served a colleague litigating a motion to introduce evidence that a third-
party, and not his client, committed the crime (i.e., the wrong-person de-
fense). But the judge prevented him from doing so unless the third-party
was willing to appear at the prosecutor's office and sign a sworn statement
that he, in fact, was the true perpetrator.
Obviously, that legal standard was nothing more than a figment of the
judge's imagination. However, it led me to research the issue-where I
found that other judges were also barring defense lawyers from using third-
party guilt evidence-and then led me to write my article offering defense
lawyers an alternative approach for introducing their evidence. The point
is that just as professors should read the relevant statutes and case law in
order to teach a body of law that is both real (see Rule #1) and complete
(see Rule #2), so too should they observe the practice of law 4 9-for exam-
ple, as it unfolds in the courtroom-so they can write about issues that will
deepen their understanding of the topics they teach their students.
Granted, this practical-scholarship approach does not fit well within
the rankings-obsessed world of legal academia where even long-since-ten-
ured professors monitor their articles' every citation and Social Science Re-
search Network (SSRN) download. But practical legal scholarship actually
that, when editing impractical interdisciplinary scholarship, the law review members are not engaged
and instead "become mere grammar, spelling, and punctuation checkers").
45. Newton, supra note 3, at 114 ("A professor's record of publishing practical-as opposed to
academic or theoretical-scholarship also generally hurts her chances of being hired, promoted, and
granted tenure.").
46. Id. at 126.
47. Arguably, professors' lack of practical experience could even provide a unique perspective
when writing about practical legal issues. See Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 35, at 785 ("[Mlost law
professors are better equipped to produce objective evaluations of the law because they are not con-
fronted with the inherent biases of legal practice.").
48. Michael D. Cichini, An Alternative to the Wrong-Person Defense, 24 Gio. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 1 (2013).
49. Arguably, producing practical scholarship does not even require that much preparatory ef-
fort. Merely "delving into case law and other primary sources," instead of reading impractical articles
written by other law professors, may be sufficient. Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 35, at 776.
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has tangible, though often unquantifiable, benefits. For example, my arti-
cle outlining an alternative approach to the wrong-person defense likely
will not garner citations from professors writing about baseball or neural
networks. But it has been cited in defense lawyers' briefs, and I have re-
ceived several phone calls from defense lawyers telling me they used the
article to introduce evidence of their clients' innocence-something they
otherwise could not have done because, much like the judge that inspired
my article, their judges prevented them from using the traditional wrong-
person defense (thus making the alternative defense highly valuable).
And there is more good news for the professors who are willing to
make this leap to practical scholarship: writing for lawyers is no less theo-
retical than writing about movie-inspired fantasies of the open road or how
the government should tax zombies. One of my articles, for example, ap-
plied the discipline of economics to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule. Other articles applied published social science findings to the admis-
sibility of eyewitness identification evidence, and the admissibility of expert
testimony on false confessions. There is a whole world of serious, practical,
yet highly theoretical topics just waiting to be explored, explained, or sim-
plified 50-provided a professor is willing to invest the time to observe the
law as it unfolds in the courtroom (or in administrative hearings, or public
meetings, or wherever their particular area of law plays out).
IV. CONCLUSION
In writing this Essay I do not mean to discourage the more dramatic
reforms recommended by Newton, like hiring professors who have excelled
in the practice of law. In fact, although I dismissed this particular idea as
impractical, it might actually be feasible for some schools. Most law
schools are slaves to the U.S. News & World Report rankings."1 And hiring
a seasoned practitioner, instead of an unsullied J.D.-Ph.D. from an elite
school, would damage the hiring school's U.S. News peer-reputation score
and, consequently, its overall ranking.52 But this would not hold true for
every school.
50. See id. at 763 (arguing that practical legal issues "are amazingly complex, often require inter-
disciplinary legal analysis, and present rich and intricate issues of law, theory, and practice").
51. Newton, supra note 3, at 77 (discussing the "'prestige race' among law schools and an obses-
sion among administrators, faculty members, and law students over schools' rankings").
52. Id. at 77 (Peer reputation is "worth 25% of a school's total score" and is therefore "a criti-
cally important component" of a school's U.S. News rank.). And a school's peer reputation, in turn, is
determined by how well its faculty can impress the faculty of other schools. The flawed nature of this
system was on full display when the U.S. News released its 2016 rankings: "If you still wanted for proof
that these rankings are utterly baseless hogwash, UC-Irvine's immediate insertion into the [top 30]
should remove the last bits of the emperor's clothing. Here we have a law school whose oldest gradu-
ates are in their third year of practice. The school has little to no name recognition outside of Califor-
nia. Indeed, the entire venture seemed to have the express purpose of gaming the U.S. News
methodology and jump-starting a 'top' law school." Rankings Review: The UC-Irvine Problem,
OUTSIDE THE LAW SCiiOOL SCAM (Mar. 9, 2015), http://outsidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2015/
03/rankings-review-uc-irvine-problem.html.
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For example, perennial fourth tier (or "rank not published") U.S.
News schools, in essence, have nothing to lose, and would be the perfect
candidates for a complete top-to-bottom overhaul of their professor hiring
practices and their curriculum. Without the risk of falling in the U.S. News
rankings-there is, after all, no fifth tier-and with no realistic chance of
rising significantly, why not hire professors who are accomplished lawyers
instead of Ph.D.s? Why not design a program that integrates meaningful
skills-based training from day one, instead of treating it as a third-year side-
show taught by marginalized adjunct or clinical instructors?
So there is a real opportunity for some law schools to shun the rank-
ings game-a game they never should have cared about in the first place-
and instead produce lawyers who are ready to walk into a courtroom (or an
administrative hearing room or a corporate conference room) and start
practicing law competently from day one. Medical schools do this, and so
too could law schools, or at least those law schools bold enough to shed
their U.S. News chains.
I wrote this Essay, however, because such comprehensive reform is
simply not realistic for the vast majority of law schools-especially those
that still aspire to U.S. News glory. But even at these status-obsessed law
schools, the professors must, at least to some degree, acknowledge that
"[l]aw school should be a professional school whose primary mission is to
produce competent, ethical members of the profession."53 And toward
that end, the three rules proposed in this Essay would be incredibly easy to
implement-even with the existing professoriate and without any funda-
mental changes to the existing law school model or curriculum.
Meaningful change can be immediately realized if professors would
teach their students an actual (see Rule #1) and complete (see Rule #2)
body of law, and write about real legal issues that affect the profession (see
Rule #3). In addition to being the most important step toward creating
competent lawyers, this modest, three-rule proposal could also accomplish
much more. That is, relevant and thorough legal education combined with
reality-based legal scholarship might, over time, bridge the existing discon-
nect between academia and the bar.54 Over the long run, these three rules
for educating tomorrow's lawyers could actually return law schools, law
professors, and even law reviews to a meaningful place within the legal
profession.
53. Newton, supra note 3, at 113.
54. Id. at 117 (discussing the "disconnect between the legal academy and the legal profession" as
well as the two groups' "reciprocal disdain" for each other).
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